One of the recent hot topics in bioethics literature is so-called "human enhancement". There has been an avalanche of publications tackling a variety of topics involved, and here I seek to clear the issue a bit.
The idea of technologically enhancing human beings has been present in science fiction for more than a half a century. Ever since genetically or bionically altering human beings has been more than fantasy and a genuine scientific possibility there has been growing ethical debate whether this should be ethically permissible or not. During the 90's and early 00's the debate had evolved so that the playing field could be crudely divided into two sides: the generally cautious (or bioconservative) block, and the more or less enthusiastic (or posthumanist) block.

The typical argument scheme employed by either side in the debate was (and still tends to be) the Slippery Slope: if we now permit A, it will eventually lead to B and C. The conservative slippery slope often leads to division of human population into the enhanced, well-off übermensch and an au naturel underclass (or some other kind of dystopia), whereas the posthuman slippery slope often fantasizes about even more rapid technological development, cessation of wars, happiness for all and the similar.

Without a functioning crystal ball or other divination methods, it's hard to evaluate from objective viewpoint these sequences of presumed events. Both hopes and fears do seem justified, but on the sole basis of initial optimism or pessimism one cannot provide us with sufficient grounds for determining whether or not enhancing humans is for the better or the worse. "Well, it depends," is the informed reply.

Because it does depend a lot, there have been other, more philosophically sophisticated arguments. One distinction has been made between invasive and uninvasive techniques for altering human beings. Some paradigm examples of invasive techniques include inserting implants directly into human brain, genetic manipulation, or certain pharmaceutical products such as mood altering or cognitive enhancement drugs. These are often contrasted with education, which is considered to be an example of uninvasive enhancement.

The core distinction between these two seems to be whether or not something physical and concrete is inserted into human body to enhance its natural functioning; or in moral terms, whether or not we violate the authentic being of the person with something alien and whether or not this makes up for a case for proper moral questioning.

Some of these arguments from authenticity can be dismissed as just a matter of aesthetics. There's something ugly or disgusting (often articulated in terms of "unnatural") about tampering with our default physical and mental make-up with these methods. Problems in these sorts of arguments are apparent: to convince a general educated audience about why we all should accept the same set of norms of what is nice and pleasant and what is ugly and unpleasant takes a great deal of intellectual firepower, usually more than anyone of us can provide. And what is "natural" and what is not, well - it's not like Mother Nature herself personally whispers these things in our ears.

The basic problem in this invasive/uninvasive enhancement argument is somewhat metaphysical. If you accept the distinction as morally relevant, consider for a moment eating chocolate, having a cup of coffee, downing a pint of beer or lighting a cigarette once in a while. In all these activities you insert mood altering or cognitive performance enhancing substances of varying potency into your body. The difference between these and the off-label use of certain pharmacological products isn't that big; it's more about what has been customary and what has not.

And in what sense is education not invasive? We use air vibrations and reflections of light to alter our cognitive states with carefully coded information. Something alien enters our body through stimulating our sense organs; just that it's not as concrete and offensive looking as a metal prong protruding from our skull. A matter of aesthetics, is all.

In fact, this enhancement stuff is what we have been doing as long as human history has been recorded – and presumably longer if we are to believe archaeologists. Or if we believe philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers, whose seminal paper The Extended Mind can be accessed through the internet.*

What is in the need of revision is our understanding of what kind of being a human is. We use instruments to solve our problems; such as written language to extend our defective memory into paper or to computer software as more reliable and stable notes, and images and words to extend our personal presence into the virtual reality of social internet. We're bad at big numbers, so we rely on electronic calculators instead of our intracranial stone-age wetware to produce accurate results. If our problem is that we are not enough for the challenges in our environment, the instinctive reaction is to provide a technological solution – either to the environment, or to ourselves. It's what we do, and insofar it has been more or less a great thing, if not indifferent. If this does not counter the "unnaturalness" argument, I don't know what does.

The central issue is not, thus, the enhancement itself, but everything else. Who has access to these enhancement technologies, and how to ensure that we all are in the same line – in fact, should we be in the same line, or should some groups be privileged for or prevented from access? Do these technologies promote or undermine social equality, as they provide edge in competitive settings? How should we as a society prepare to situations, where they are used for both good and bad purposes?

* Clark, A. & Chalmers, D: The Extended Mind. Orginally published in Analysis 58:10-23, 1998. http://consc.net/papers/extended.html

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	Human enhancement - Some issues clarified.pdf