Recent years have seen a surge in the use of ICT implants in the human body, for medical, and non-medical purposes.  The ethical concerns surrounding this matter are extensive.  I have touched on a few in this article.

Development of the Radio Frequency Identification Tag (RFID) has improved and facilitated ubiquitous communication.  Generally, RFID tags require an external source, such as a sensor to activate them.  These chips have been used for tracking and monitoring animals, however, their use has recently extended to the human body.  For example, the Baja Beach Club in Barcelona offers its privileged customers the chance to be ‘tagged’ with one of these devices, also referred to as the VeriChip.  In the nightclub setting it is aimed at improving efficiency of transactions and service on the side of the customer, and the business.  This raises all sorts of worries that seem to hinge on breaching Articles of some of the European declarations, for example, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which places, among others, principles such as human dignity and inviolability of the human body extremely highly.

In 1998, Professor Kevin Warwick from the Department of Cybernetics, Warwick University had a VeriChip implanted in his upper left arm for experimental purposes, “I just wanted to see what it was like” (Warwick, 2003, 133).  During the experiment, Warwick had the opportunity to experience doors automatically opening for him, and his computer greeting his presence.

In 2002, Professor Warwick conducted a further experiment where he had an ‘active’ chip implanted, rather than an RFID tag.  The main difference is that the active implants power themselves and interact directly with computer systems, with no need for a medium.  Warwick’s wife also had a chip implanted.  As well as interacting with systems, the two chips were also able to interact with one another.  This raises serious questions about the possibility of ‘thought communication.’  Simply speculating about such technology is plagued with ethical concerns.  Firstly, Warwick’s optimism struck me as a little worrying,

“I always felt positive towards the implant, despite any dangers that might have been associated with it.  Essentially, it did things for me and not against me” (Warwick, 2003, 134).

With many of the new and emerging technologies I worry that people may struggle to see the potential dangers through all the benefits.  The active implant may be directly linked to the internet where there becomes a danger of misuse of personal information.  With regard to thought communication, I worry about the disappearance of a private realm, if thoughts were to become ‘visible’ to others.  If schools were to conduct lessons via thought, would it only occur in private schools, and hence, only be available to the wealthy? 

As well as the uses described above, ICT implants have also been used for medical purposes for some time.  For example, the deep brain stimulation implant, used in the treatment of Parkinson’s Disease.  However, there have been suggestions that such technology may have an impact on the ‘self’ due to the invasive nature of the surgery.  Of course, personal identity itself is a whole philosophical domain, and so you can begin to see the complexity of the issues we are facing.  For this reason, I think it is important for researchers, scientists and engineers to take time to reflect on the enormity of ethical worries associated with ICT implants in the human body, and other new and emerging technologies.

References

Capurro, R. and Rodota, S. (2005). ‘Ethical aspects of ICT implants in the human body.’ Opinion of the European Group of Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commssion.

European Commission. (2000/C 364/01). ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.’ Official Journal of the European Communities.

Fuchs, T. (2006). ‘Ethical issues in neuroscience.’ Current Opinion in Psychiatry. Vol. 19. (6). pp. 600-607
Masters, A. and Michael, K. (2006). ‘Lend me your arms: The use and implications of humancentric RFID.’ Electronic Commerce Research Applications. Vol. 6. pp. 29-39

Parfit, D. (1986). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Warwick, K. (2008). ‘Cyborg Morals, Cyborg Values, Cyborg Ethics.’ Ethics and Information Technology. Vol. 5 (3). pp. 131-137

Charlotte Harwell currently undertaking an MA in Philosophy at the University of Lancaster, and also working part time as a Research Assistant in Cesagen on the European Commission-funded project ICT Ethics. Her research on the one hand are in the ethical, legal and societal issues related to new and emerging technologies, such as biometric security at airports, robotics in all domains (including the home, surveillance, transport and medicine), and ambient intelligent technologies.  On the other hand, she is interested in both meta-ethical and meta-physical questions in Philosophy, particularly the Philosophy of Hume, Hegel and also, Blackburn.

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