The conventional view is the belief that suicide is wrong. This belief is supported by arguments from different perspectives – religious, philosophical and psychological. My aim, in this short article, is to critically examine a particular philosophical argument (with psychological implications) for and against suicide, challenging the belief that suicide is fundamentally non-rational.

The conventional view against suicide can be defended by an argument articulated by Immanuel Kant. He argues that suicide undermines the raison d’etre of our humanity by undermining the capacity to freely set and rationally pursue particular ends. In other words, whilst particular acts of suicide, considered by it self, may be free choices – as in setting oneself ‘any end whatsoever’ – they would not be consistent with preserving and promoting ones capacity to make and carry out further choices (Kant, eds. Heath Schneewind 1997). So, successfully committing suicide, even if it is itself a free choice, would destroy ones ability to ever make any further choices. Suicide in this view is clearly, not consistent, with the preservation of our capacity for freedom. Since preserving the capacity for our freedom is vital for Kant if we are to preserve our humanity and its rationality, committing suicide as a general rule, would violate what Kant calls a perfect duty towards the self.

This philosophical argument resonates with many of our common sense intuitions about the perceived tragedy of many suicides, where those who are close to the victim perceive the missed opportunities to act otherwise. Furthermore, this view connects with more prudential arguments in psychiatry, where a patient who is not mentally competent, might be particularly vulnerable to the risk of suicide. It is worth noting, however, that the philosophical and psychological arguments against the rationality of suicide are not interchangeable. That is, while the philosophical argument attempts to provide more universal reasons why suicide is not rational in respect to preserving the capacity for human freedom per se, psychiatric criteria such as lack of ‘mental competence’ provide further and particular reasons why a individual may be vulnerable – in the sense of lacking the mental capacity for example, to weigh up the pros and cons of living versus suicide. This marks an important departure in the space of reasons why we might offer a defence against suicide. For example, whilst a psychiatrist may assess a patient to be mentally competent to rationally weigh up the pros and cons of committing suicide, there are further reasons why committing suicide may undermine the capacity for the preservation of our freedom as a human being. In other words, whilst mental competence is a necessary psychological perspective for assessing the rationality of suicide of mentally ill and vulnerable patients, it is not a sufficient condition for establishing its plausibility as an act that preserves ones humanity and capacity to make further choices.

To offer, what I call, a post-conventional defence of the rationality of suicide, we need an argument for suicide that a defence of mental competence alone cannot provide. That is, we need a deeper philosophical argument that questions what it is to be a free rational human being where the freedom to commit suicide in certain circumstances is not inconsistent with our understanding of ends of humanity so defined. Such an argument is provided by the Stoic view on suicide.

The basic foundation of Stoic ethics is the idea of self-preservation as way of ascribing value to life. For non-rational animals what we ascribe as good for self preservation are straightforward: food, shelter and water etcetera. However, according to the Stoics, if I am to survive as a rational being and not merely as an animal I must pursue those things that will preserve my rationality as well as those things that preserve my body. However, according to the Stoics, if I am to survive as a rational human being and not merely as an animal I must pursue those things that preserve my rationality as well as my body. In short, I must take care of my soul as well as taking care of my body. The Stoic defence of suicide relies on the biological and rational forms of self-preservation coming in to conflict. So, if I am going to be human being who is free to use their reason independent of others, I will sometimes have to make choices that appear not to further my own self-preservation. For example, if a tyrant threatens to kill me if I do not agree to do certain things that will be unequivocally objectionable and morally wrong, then if I am to preserve myself as a rational being, I should stand up to the tyrant even if it may mean the loss of my life (Sellars 2006: 107-134). Although this course of action does not contribute to my self-preservation in so far as I am merely a living animal, giving into the will of the tyrant would threaten to destroy my existence as a free and independent rational being. In brief, I may be biologically alive if I submit to the tyrant, but I will have sacrificed something far more important, the freedom to exercise my reason. Indeed many famous suicides in classical times – for example, Cato, Socrates and Seneca – are rational decisions made on the basis of preserving the virtue of the soul, over and above the continued preservation of the body. Ironically then, the preservation of our capacity to freely choose a rational life, may in certain particular circumstances require us to sacrifice our continued existence as a mere animal whose primary concern is biological or bare life.

While many of these arguments are most clearly illustrative of heroic suicides in classical times, it may be extended to contemporary medical ethics and how we view suicide in circumstances where medically competent individuals are given a prognosis of a terminal illness. Clearly, in many kinds of terminal illnesses the biological existence of a human being outstrips their continued existence as rational beings. This is no better illustrated, than in psycho geriatric medicine, where diagnosis of early Alzheimer’s, may prompt a medically competent patient to contemplate suicide at a particular point. In terms of their capacity to freely preserve their rational self, this is perfectly understandable and may need to be considered as a morally permissible act.

Note on style – academically orientated polemic

References:

Kant, I (1997) Lectures on Ethics Ed. Heath, P and Schneewind J., trans. Heath P. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sellars, J (2006) Stoicism Chesham: Acumen.

Tomasini, “Understanding Rational Suicide” IPA Bulletin 2009: 26(2): 12-15

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